MontaVista CVE List and Response

MontaVista continually monitors the security community and customers for threats. We follow the community on CVE scoring (NVD) and set fix priority accordingly for affected products. Please view the following CVEs that have been remediated or are in process by clicking the CVE Year to the left or use the CVE Filters below.

For reporting Known Exploitable Vulnerabilities (KEV) or new Security Vulnerabilities, please see our Vulnerability Response Policy or email our PSIRT team. Messages and attachments should be encrypted using PGP and a MontaVista PSIRT PGP key, which is available for download here.

Year
Product
Score
Severity
Status
CVE
CVE Score Severity Package Description Published
CVE-2026-9672
8.1 (i)
HIGHlibgd php ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. 2026-11-12
CVE-2026-99288
7.5 (i)
HIGHkernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:inet: reject unhashed sockets during established lookupsTCP established ehash lookups are lockless. The socket caches involveduse SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so memory can be reused before an RCU readerthat retained its old address has finished.After a tuple match, __inet_lookup_established() and__inet6_lookup_established() acquire a reference and repeat the tuplecheck. They do not check whether the new object is hashed. If theaddress is reused for a socket with the same tuple, the lookup canacquire a reference to the new object and return it while its nulls nodeis unhashed.A PoC that drives reuse with a SYN cookie request socket reproduced thecrash. The new request socket is unhashed and has a NULL rsk_listener.A lookup that had loaded the address of the old request socket acquiredthe reference published by tcp_get_cookie_sock() and returned the newobject. tcp_v4_rcv() then read sk_state through the NULL listener.The resulting crash was: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page ... Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 7.3.0-00591-g0e135910deec #1 PREEMPT(lazy) ... RIP: 0010:tcp_v4_rcv+0x44e/0x1280 ... R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000024ca8c0 R12: 0000000000000000 ... CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000103d50004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> ? raw_local_deliver+0xae/0x240 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2d/0x180 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x84/0x100 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70 ip_sublist_rcv+0x12a/0x1d0 ip_list_rcv+0xfd/0x130 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x223/0x250 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d2/0x2c0 ? try_fill_recv+0x39/0x7b0 napi_complete_done+0x74/0x170 virtnet_poll+0x445/0x600 __napi_poll+0x27/0x1e0 net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3b0 handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x2c0 __irq_exit_rcu+0x74/0xd0 common_interrupt+0x7f/0x90 </IRQ> ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interruptAfter taking a reference, check whether the nulls node is unhashed inboth IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups. If it is unhashed or the tupleno longer matches, drop the reference and restart the lookup.Lookups racing with the TIME_WAIT hashdance, or with a request beingreplaced by its child, now restart and find the new socket instead ofreturning the old one.Request sockets that were never inserted into ehash can have a nonzerorefcount, and a stale lookup can hold a transient reference. Therefore,when SYN cookie, Fast Open, and request migration paths fail aftersetting a nonzero refcount, release the references held by those pathswith reqsk_put() instead of freeing the request directly. 2026-11-10
CVE-2026-35328
7.5 (i)
HIGHstrongswan ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. 2026-11-08
CVE-2026-35329
7.5 (i)
HIGHstrongswan ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. 2026-11-08
CVE-2026-35330
8.1 (i)
HIGHstrongswan ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. 2026-11-08
CVE-2026-35331
4.8 (i)
MEDIUMstrongswan ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. 2026-11-08
CVE-2026-35332
7.5 (i)
HIGHstrongswan ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. 2026-11-08
CVE-2026-35333
7.5 (i)
HIGHstrongswan ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. 2026-11-08
CVE-2026-35334
7.5 (i)
HIGHstrongswan ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. 2026-11-08
CVE-2026-99281
7.8 (i)
HIGHkernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tun: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach to an ownerless deviceTwenty years ago I made creating a tuntap device require CAP_NET_ADMINin commit ca6bb5d7ab22 ("[NET]: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to create tuntapdevices.")The idea was to allow the permissions on /dev/net/tun to be relaxed to0666 and thus allow owners of tun devices assigned with TUNSETOWNER toactually open it and get at their devices.What we missed at the time was that persistent devices with *no* ownerwere already essentially world-consumable, and anyone who could openthe device node could also attach to those.Even then, using persistent devices with no explicitly set owner — onthe (false) presumption that CAP_NET_ADMIN would be required to openthem — wasn't an egregious userspace bug. There are cases where it doesmake sense to separate the creation/configuration of the netdevice, fromthe process which shovels packets into it.Since then, TUNSETGROUP was added a year later in commit 8c644623fe7e("[NET]: Allow group ownership of TUN/TAP devices."). Its commit messagenoted that if both uid and gid are set, both have to match (in itself abizarre choice) — but still not that with *neither* set, no permissionat all was required.Then in 2012 commit c8d68e6be1c3 ("tuntap: multiqueue support") allowednew queues to be attached to a device from the moment of its creation,with no way for userspace to close the race between creation and asubsequent TUNSET{OWNER,GROUP}.In 2024, commit 3ca459eaba1bf ("tun: fix group permission check") triedto fix things to be saner: only require the user *or* the group tomatch, in line with standard POSIX permissions, and requireCAP_NET_ADMIN if neither the user nor group authorised the access(although it put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check first, and would wrongly havereported the capability as having been used even when it was not).That fix was reverted in commit a70c7b3cbc06 ("tun: revert fix grouppermission check") due to allegedly causing a regression in an selinuxtest suite which *expected* the attachment to succeed when authorisedby none of user, group, nor CAP_NET_ADMIN:https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAFqZXNtkCBT4f+PwyVRmQGoT3p1eVa01fCG_aNtpt6dakXncUg@mail.gmail.com/We should not break UAPI. But we don't have to consider an selinux testcase which deliberately exercises a security flaw to be UAPI worthpreserving either. To which end, I have fixed it in selinux-testsuitecommit b2f894f0016b ("tests/tun_tap: set an owner on the device for therelabel tests").So: fix the lack of CAP_NET_ADMIN check on devices which *haven't* beenassigned an owner or group, while leaving the weird tun ownership modelas it was (user *and* group have to match, if both are set). If someonestill wants to fix the latter (which wasn't actually the reason theprevious attempt was reverted), they can do it under separate cover.Permit attaching to an existing device only if an owner and/or group wasset and the caller matches all that were set, or if the caller hasCAP_NET_ADMIN. The only behavioural change is that a device with noowner or group now requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach — precisely theloophole we want to close.And put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check in the right place this time. 2026-11-07